Following the hasty withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, an increasing number of analysts speak and write about weaknesses of Europe and Washington vis-à-vis illiberal, authoritarian regimes. Such pundits see Western powers and liberal internationalism timidly retreating from the global stage, where illiberal authoritarianism and nationalist protectionism appear to gain ground. Some even engage with the idea that the West may have in fact entered a process of decline. However, while the latest developments in Afghanistan could well be the symptom of profound change in the international arena, talking about the West declining in a logic of confrontation with the East is rather problematic.
The main post-WWII features of the West-brokered international order have remained intact. Although being often accused of inefficiency, the UN and international organizations under its umbrella continue to perform important roles according to their founding principles and treaties. The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the international organizations regulating trade relations are also alive and functioning. It should not be forgotten that they have helped countries overcome many, major economic and financial crises. Although at lower rates due especially to the COVID pandemic, capitals, goods and services continue to flow. Illiberal regimes of all types, including Afghanistan under Taliban rule, remain dependent on international, especially Western capital for development. That is while it has become quite clear that Chinese money, as alternative capital, usually comes at very high political, economic-financial and environmental costs, as seen in the Western Balkans, or Turkey. Communication between “western” liberal-democracies and “eastern” illiberal, authoritarian regimes also continues, although not always at desired levels and with outcomes satisfactory for all parties.
Cracks in the Western Block
From this author’s perspective, more worrying may be the cracks that have become evident in Euro-Atlantic relations over the last years, especially concerning communication over important issues. Donald Trump’s term at the White House has left deep wounds and serious trust problems. The former US President’s decision to exit the 2015 Paris climate accord, for instance, although reversed by the Biden administration, marked a significant point of divergence. That gesture, supported by important segments in the American society, placed the US on the wrong side in a crucial debate about the future of the entire world. Problems of communication were also evident when Trump decided, back in 2018, to withdraw the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly referred to as the Iranian nuclear deal. By moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, the Trump administration inflamed even more a region that so many US Presidents have tried before to pacify with great efforts. Additionally, the decision also broke the Western consensus to postpone any decision until Israel and the Palestinian Authority reach a long-term peace accord.
Another issue affected by problems of Euro-Atlantic communication was the case of the North Stream 2 (NS2), when the initial US opposition to the project eventually dissipated. This played in the hands of Germany’s Angela Merkel, but infuriated other European, especially eastern capitals where Moscow’s pressures are felt intensely. With the twin NS2 pipelines functional as of this month, the Russian gas could start flowing toward Germany by October 1 and then to the rest of Europe when the German and Danish connections are ready. Gazprom says it could pump 5.6 billion cubic meters until the end of this year and the overall capacity could enhance to over 100 billion cubic meters per year. Critics warn though that, in the long run, NS2 will enhance Russia’s influence in Europe and its aggressive stance in relations with Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and other East European countries.
Another, rather odd situation was when Western allies failed in May 2021 to jointly impose severe sanctions on the Lukashenko regime in Belarus after authorities in Minsk forced down a Ryanair passenger plane en route from Athens to Vilnius only to arrest a dissident journalist on board. Although blame was put on Turkey for repeatedly blocking sanctions on Belarus and, earlier, on Russia, it was also obvious that Washington and its European allies actually failed to build a strong common position on those serious issues.
The most recent episode in this bitter story of distrust came when Australia decided in mid-September to scrap a 2016 contract with France’s Naval Group for the delivery of 12 diesel-powered attack-submarines in the 2030s. Instead, the government in Canberra has opted for the so-called AUKUS deal, under which nuclear-powered submarines will be built by and for Australia using American and British technologies. This decision, which only irked China, has caused outrage in France. The Australian officials had complained in the past that the Naval Group deal encountered unreasonable delays and price hikes for a rather old technology. And although, according to Canberra, the French had been warned of a change in option, this did not stop the French Foreign Minister from calling the Australian move a “stab in the back”. He also added that, “this unilateral, sudden and unforeseeable decision very much recalls what Mr. Trump would do”.
A shift towards regional co-operation
From my point of view, the few examples above are illustrative not of a so-called retreat or decline of the West, but rather of weakening by division. Under the condition that the trend is confirmed by similar episodes in the future, this may signal in fact a reordering of foreign policy agendas according to concerns at regional levels.
There are a few other examples apparently confirming this trend. There is an increase in cooperation schemes between influential states in the Gulf area, the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. Among other factors, it was especially Turkey’s aggressive stance in the region and the shift in Washington’s focus from the Middle East to Southeast Asia that determined the respective actors to develop alternatives. Saudi Arabia signals military cooperation with Russia, possibly as remedy for the apparent US unreliability after the retreat from the Middle East and, now, from Afghanistan. In an effort to mobilize regional support for Iraq and contribute to regional peace, the Iraqi government, too, has decided to become more pro-active. At the end of August, it organized the Baghdad Conference for Cooperation and Partnership. The conference was appreciated for managing to bring together regional actors that were at loggerheads not a long time ago and for initiating a process that may bring good things in the future.
In Europe proper, Trump’s policies have encouraged an increasingly intense debate on the ideas of “European sovereignty” and strategic autonomy in relation with Washington. Supported by main actors France (President Emmanuel Macron) and Germany (Chancellor Angela Merkel) and others, this debate has been triggered by complex factors not all connected to Donald Trump. Let us not forget that, for instance, the gradual US withdrawal from the Greater Middle East and Europe had been initiated by President Barrack Obama, while the AUKUS deal is being advanced under the Biden administration. It should also not be forgotten that, while contributing to the military defense of Eastern Europe facing the Russian threats, the US has failed to understand and support the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). From its inception in the early 2000s and until the Arab Spring phenomenon and the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the ENP contributed to intense cooperation between the EU and partner countries in its eastern and southern vicinity. And there is a large amount of informed analysis pointing with credible evidence at Washington’s reluctance to help the EU in the implementation of the ENP, or even resisting it.
Donald Trump gave a presidential face and voice to America’s reservations about the EU and Europeans, but the sentiment itself is not new and not limited to the ENP. It was perceived under the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, for instance, each time negotiations were being held on trade and tariffs between the European Commission and the US representatives. And the result is that there is no free trade agreement now between Washington and Brussels, while Eurostat data indicate persistent surplus for EU in the trade balance with the US.
Allies should talk
What we are experiencing now may therefore be not some sort of decline, or retreat of the “West”. We may in fact witness the symptoms of Washington attempting to re-situate itself in a new paradigm of world politics, one in which actors such as China and the EU have long been serious economic competitors and now are vying for global political relevance, too. It is in this context that Washington has been asking for almost two decades now that Europe (i.e. the EU) gets more involved in and responsible about its own security. Fears remain though that, in this soul-searching process, the US could also lose the leadership of the liberal democratic international order, with the possible consequence that the nationalist infantilism of a century ago comes back. Allies, if allies, should nevertheless talk. Leonard Woolf was writing with great optimism in the beginning of the twentieth century that, despite wars ravaging the globe, “in every department of life the beginnings, and more than the beginnings, of International Government already exist[ed]”. The respective fora are there and continue to function, now under the umbrella of the United Nations. It is in those fora that anything can be talked about, using all means available for problem-solving, provided that allies, if allies, are committed to common-sensical communication. And, yes, Europe should get more involved in and become more responsible about its own security.
